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HEGEMONY VS. BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN AND
BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS IN WORLD HISTORY
MATTHEW MELKO
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY
MATT.MELKO@WRIGHT.EDU

In the last quarter of the 20,h century, a preference for balance of
power outcomes among international political realists was challenged
by other scholars, also realists, who believed that hegemonic dominance was more desirable.
Those who focused on the balance of power argued that the most
stabilizing, if not the most peaceful, situation for an international or
state system is one in which the most powerful state, the hegemon, is
balanced by an alliance of other less powerful states that prevent it from
attempting to conquer all the states in the system.
Those who focused on the hegemon argued that, on the contrary, a
clearly established hegemon or core state tends to maintain stability,
intervening in secondary conflicts where necessary, but allowing other
less powerful states to maintain stability within their own regions.
In the early phase of a state system, it is most often the case that
the political entities first interact locally or regionally. But eventually
they tend to coalesce, in Arnold Toynbee's phrasing, into a single vortex though some civilizations may contain more than one such system
(Toynbee IX: 261). Usually this enlarged system occurs within a single
civilization, although states on the periphery are likely to interact with
peripheral states in neighboring civilizations (Toynbee III: 301-306,
Wilkinson 1985, Wesson 1978: 10-18).
Eventually these more centralized entities begin to encounter one
another and conflict between them ensues. Such a system would seem
to be unstable in that power obviously increases and decreases within
the states as leadership changes, economies fluctuate or succeeding
generations acquire or lose the taste or skill for governance and warfare.
Yet such a system can also have long-term stability, continue for centuries, and experience recurrent warfare, but also long periods of relative peace. The wars determine which of the states become great powers, capable of influencing or withstanding other states within the system. (Toynbee IX: 234-287; Coulborn 1966: 414-416; Wight 1977: 4672, 110-152; Wesson 1978: 28-35; Wilkinson 1985).
How do groups of states, having no dominant government, maintain stability? The prevailing realist view has been that if one state
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threatens to become too powerful, others may form alliances against it.
Thus a balance of power may come into existence and preserve the system. This leads to frequent changes of alliance as perceptions of power
change, yet a balance of power is eventually recovered. Something like
this has been the prevailing view of the realist school of thought in the
West, perhaps because it describes the European state system from 1618
to 1945 (Morgenthau 1978: 171-228; Wight 1977: 66-67, 96-97, 150152; Levy 1983: 8-49; Waltz 1979: 117-128, 163-170).
While dominant states have conquered all others and created spectacular empires that have received much attention from historians, it is
probable that dominant powers more often could not or did not seek to
conquer all other states. More frequently what Morgenthau calls a status quo policy (1978: 42-47) emerged because the leaders of the dominant power considered their present situation preferable to the risks of
further conquest and the difficulties of maintaining distant territories. In
the past few decades the concept of hegemony has been greatly elaborated and perceived as a normal and recurrent aspect of state systems.
The consensus goes something like this. One state, over a period,
becomes dominant, but usually that does not mean the termination of
the state system. Whether or not other states combine to prevent that
from happening, hegemony represents the height of that state's ambition
or its leaders' perception of its power. Its rulers are satisfied to lead
within the system, and other states accept this, because they perceive
that this situation brings systemic order. There will be other great powers within the system, that is, states strong enough to disrupt the order
if they choose to do so. But so long as they have sufficient power to control their own sphere of influence, usually over secondary powers within their region, they may accept the status quo for many decades.
Such a system is recurrently susceptible to violence, however, and
conflict can result because of a change in leadership within any great
power; because a new great power arises, its leadership perceiving
insufficient scope; or because the hegemon, overburdened with its
responsibilities or preoccupied with domestic concerns, weakens and is
no longer able to perform its stabilizing functions. This can lead to a
period of warfare among some or all of the great powers, with the result
that the hegemon retains its position, or is replaced by another great
power, or for a period there is no hegemon. Only occasionally does one
power conquer all and establish an imperial system. Even if it does, it
may be soon challenged and deposed, and the state system restored
(Toynbee III: 299-306; Doran 1983, Levy 1985, Modelski 1987: 7-50,
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Wilkinson 1985: 21-32; 1994).
From the hegemonic perspective, then, the stable periods of a state
system are those in which a hegemon is clearly established. This view
seemingly challenges the earlier balance of power perspective, which
views stable periods as those when no hegemon threatens to dominate.
It was noted by Toynbee that the state that dominates or conquers
the others in a system is often peripheral to the state system. The
Akkadian Empire, the Middle Kingdom, the Achemenid, the Mauryan,
the Qin-Han, the Mughal Empire, the Inca, the Ottoman, the British Raj
would fit that description and, in Toynbee's time, the United States and
the Soviet Union appeared to Europeans to be potential peripheral contenders for imperial domination. Today, the United States is still widely
perceived as posing that threat. This idea of peripheral domination has
been developed by civilizationists and world systems analysts as the
concept of core-peripheral relationships (Toynbee III: 301-306; Quigley
1979: 57-58; Wallerstein 1974: 38, 100-103, 116-119; Chase-Dunn and
Hall 1997: 35-37,224-225).
Both hegemons and multipower systems have often extended
across civilizational borders. Western, Byzantine and Islamic civilizations have often been involved in each other's systems along the
Russian frontier, in the Balkans and in Anatolia. In the second millennium BCE there were a few centuries in which great powers from
Egyptian. Mesopotamian and Hittite civilizations formed a system well
integrated by diplomacy and war. In the latter half of the 20th century
and at the beginning of the 21 s ', however, the current hegemon appears
to be the first that has attempted global reach.
In 2004, writing on the subject of diplomacy, American Secretary
of State Colin Powell argued that the problem for his government was
to deal with threats to system stability while gathering support from
other major powers within the system. Otherwise leaders in other states
might perceive the hegemon as either failing to preserve that stability if
it appears to be too weak, or threatening the system if it appears to act
too forcefully and without support.
Given the difficulties of identifying systems, not to mention hegemons, multipower situations and outcomes, and given the situation at
the beginning of the 21st century, after the apparent hegemon has intervened in several cases in East Asian, Latin American and Islamic civilizations, what can be said about the desirability of either clear hegemony or balance of power for achieving or maintaining systemic stability
or peace?
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The difficulty of looking for patterns in state systems may be illustrated by the concept of general war developed by Toynbee. His idea
was that within state systems, great powers periodically fight one another, and that a rhythm could be discerned in these conflicts. The great
powers would fight a general war, the resolution would be partial and
there would be a breathing space; then a second round of general war
would reach some kind of resolution in terms of balance of power
among these states, and a general peace would follow, only to end, after
a time, in a new general war.
The idea was picked up in the 1970's. particularly by American
political scientists, beginning with L. L. Farrar (1977), articulated by
Jack Levy (1983, 1985), and continued into the 1990's, by which time
Toynbee's thesis had been modified, but tested mostly against Western
cases. By this time the consensus suggested that general wars ended in
the establishment of a hegemony in which a dominant power intervened
in potential conflicts, and kept warfare at a secondary level, while other
great powers fought minor wars to control or intervene in the affairs of
secondary powers within their spheres of influence. Eventually the
hegemon would be challenged by a new rising power, leading to a new
general war and the reestablishment of hegemony, either by the resident
hegemon or by a new great power (Melko, 2001a: 21-46).
1 attempted to test this consensus by studying general wars in what
I considered to be mainstream civilizations, but as I did, I became aware
of how much reification has to go into the constructing of such a test.
Civilizations are themselves reifications. I then decided somewhat arbitrarily that general wars had to last two decades to be considered, then
had to make decisions about the wars themselves, including when and
where they began and ended, in the process creating wars that possibly
no one had ever heard of before. I don't mean that the wars did not
occur, only that they were not perceived as single wars, just as the
Thirty Years War was initially perceived as four separate wars or, in our
own time, the World Wars were perceived as two, but since the 1970s
are being perceived by many scholars as one (e.g. Farrar 1977,
Goodspeed 1977).
By this process I found 38 general wars in ten civilizations, and
could say that they did not fit the concept of cycles or hegemony that I
had found in the consensus. As often as not there was not a clearly
established hegemon at the beginning or the end of these wars. Nor was
general peace a recurring phenomenon, as Toynbee believed. All that
can be said is that in most state systems, general wars occur rarely, gen-
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eral peace is equally rare, but in normal times peace is normal, war sporadic and regional.
By my assessment of the 38 cases of general war, 19 ended in hegemony, 15 in state systems lacking a hegemon and four in empires (2001:
275-276). The paucity of imperial outcomes in this study reflects the
probability that civilizationally wide imperial systems are rare. We note
the few that emerge for long periods and fail to give much attention to
many more that emerge and quickly dissipate. My assessments—findings is surely too strong a term—correlate with those of David
Wilkinson, who has been patiently examining political forms over quarters of centuries, and in one case by decades, for several major civilizations. Recently (2005) he has summarized his ongoing, painstaking
research on fluctuations in political consolidation. His studies of 14 centuries of East Asian history, 21 centuries of South Asian history, 41 centuries of Mesopotamian history, 13 centuries of Egyptian history and
eight centuries of three combined Mediterranean civilizations indicate
that empires have been infrequent while the most common political
form by far is a multistate political system lacking hegemon or
alliances.
Recently I have followed the hegemons from my general war study
for another two centuries following the general war from which they
emerged or survived. Since in four cases a second general war was
experienced by the hegemon, I wound up with 15 cases to follow.
The 15, organized civilizationally, are: Thebes after the
Herakleopolitan Wars (2108-2052); Assyria after the Second Assyrian
General War (744-702); Seleucid Persia after the Diadochid Wars (321281); Parthian Persia after the Wars of Parthian Accession (161-113);
Sassanid Persia after the Wars of Sassanid Consolidation (243-268);
Rome after the Punic Wars 254-188); Chalukya after the Chalukyan
General Wars in India (610-680); The Delhi Sultanate after the KhaljiTughluq Wars (1296-1351); The Tepanecs after the Wars of Tepanec
Hegemony in Mesoamerica (1367-1418); Byzantium after the AbbasidBufgar Wars (803-824); Byzantium after the Seljuk Wars 1068-1098);
The Ottomans after the Wars of Byzantine Decline (1326-1389) and the
Wars of Ottoman Ascendancy 1514-1551); The Abbasids after the Wars
of Abbasid Decline (869-907); France after the Thirty Years War 16141648), the Wars of Louis XIV (1688-1713), the Wars of Frederick the
Great (1740-1763) and the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815); and the
United States after the World Wars (1914-1945).
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Six of these never depended on alliances: Assyria, the Parthians,
the Sassanids, Rome, the Delhi Sultanate and the Ottomans; the Middle
Kingdom and the Seleucids consolidated without renewing alliances;
the Chalukyans and French experienced frequently changing alliances
before and after the general wars; Byzantium after the Seljuk Wars and
the Abbasid Caliphate were definitely weakened by lost alliances and
for three of the hegemons — the Tepanecs, Byzantium after the Abbasid
Wars and the United States— a key ally became the principal challenger. Of these, the fracture of the alliance was crucial in the loss of
Tepanec hegemony, and a factor in the loss of Abbasid hegemony.
Other great powers remained or arose in all cases, and only the
Romans were not at some point seriously challenged. The hegemons
were about as likely to initiate as to respond to challenge. The Middle
Kingdom, Ottomans and French initiated attacks against formidable
opponents. The Romans and Americans initiated several wars, but never
against a great power. The French were challenged several times, but
never initiated a general war, not even the Napoleonic.
Recalling Secretary Powell's concern about the hegemon appearing
to be neither too strong nor too weak, the Assyrians, Seleucids,
Chalukyans and Tepanecs did not survive as states and the Delhi
Sultanate and Abbasids also lost their hegemony. Eight states maintained their hegemony for two centuries following the general war and
five of these—the Middle Kingdom, Sassanid, Roman, Post-Abbasid
Byzantine and Ottoman—reached dominant or imperial status. The
United States has maintained its hegemony for the first six decades following its general war.
Economic decline was a major factor in the weakening of the
Byzantine Empire after the Seljuk Wars and the Abbasid loss of hegemony; probably it was less of a factor in the Delhi Sultanate's relinquishing of hegemony. In the other twelve cases, economies were
robust, stable or resilient.
Eight of the hegemons appear to have been little affected by evils
of maturation, and three seem to have managed it. It was definitely a
factor in the decline and weakening of the Delhi Sultanate, Byzantium
after the Seljuk Wars, the Abbasids and the Ottomans after the Wars of
Ascendancy. The Romans, French and Americans were also affected
but the first two, and the Americans so far, appear to have compensated
for seemingly excessive consumption by correspondingly resilient
economies.
Seven of the 15 hegemons could be said to have presided over peri-
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ods of peace and stability for the two centuries following the end of preceding general wars. The United States, so far, has presided over if not
preserved peace in its own civilization and over Latin American civilization as well. Whether its interventions in other civilizations have
contributed to peace is a question that will have to be left to later historians.
To say that state systems maintain stability over very long periods
of time does not, of course, say that they maintain peace. War has been
a recurring though not ubiquitous part of this stability. I have, however,
over the past four decades been involved, with colleagues, in the study
of peace in history. From this I can make a few brief observations, the
provisional nature of which will demonstrate why they have not yet
achieved world fame.
Peace is normal in state systems. General wars involving most of
the great powers of a civilization take place less than 10 per cent of the
time, and even they involve only sporadic fighting. Even during the
World Wars, more than 85 per cent of the months were free of fighting.
The rest of the time there may be a regional or local war here and there,
but most of the states are at peace. Individual states may maintain peace
for centuries. Occasionally there will be decades of peace for an entire
civilization. General peace, which Western Civilization is currently
experiencing, does not follow general war in any particular pattern
(Melko 1973, 1996: 90-92, 2001a: 202-203, 208-11; Melko, Weigel et
al 1981; Melko and Hord 1984).
It is probably more satisfactory to say that there are wars and
peaces in history that are reminiscent of others in the same or other civilizations. If we look for similarities and differences in each we may be
able to gain some insights into a present situation by comparing it with
the past, but we are unlikely to be able to predict the future in any detail,
and often not at all.
Peace is achieved when great powers are satisfied with the current
situation to the extent that they think war will not improve it. This
applies whether a hegemon exists or not. It may be that a hegemon is
perceived as preserving a situation that is better than any other that is
likely to be achieved, or it may be that the defeat of a hegemon creates
a situation in which no power poses an overwhelming threat to others.
These perceptions can change over time by the advent of an aggressive
government or by changes in the strength of various powers including
the hegemon. When the normative consensus about the adequacy of the
present situation exists, peace is likely to continue. All of this, of course,
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is quite unsatisfactory for finding a formula for peace, nor does it
resolve the disagreement between balance of power and hegemonic theories, nor does it take into consideration varieties of civil izational pattern.
Impotence appears to be a recurrent factor in peace. States do not
attack one another because of exhaustion from previous wars, or
because—as is often the case—defense is superior to offense and attack
is unlikely to be worth the cost, or because states cannot reach one
another. Impotence because of inability to defend against nuclear counter attack has not been sufficiently tested.
Economic integration, a great hope for the future, received mild
support from our research, though it was far from a guarantee.
Democracy is a relatively recent event and is still being appraised.
The same is true of the idea that there may be stages of peace in the
process of evolving.
The conclusions of our group were that circumstances supporting
the achievement of peace were "highly contextual, achievable under
many different circumstances, and often dependent on the desire of
rulers and policy makers to achieve or maintain peace, and their ability
to assess and respond to existing and perhaps changing situations."
Neither this conclusion nor the following of hegemons for two centuries produce a very helpful formula for future policy makers, but they
do not preclude the possibility that the combination of an increasing
number of democracies, a great increase in world trade, and the long
term development of zones of peace will create a political equivalent of
the industrial revolution, increasing possibilities for world harmony as
the economic transformation has for world production.
How does the United States compare to hegemons of the past?
The United States has not been weakened by perceived responsibilities, whether defending or expanding. It somewhat resembles Rome in
that it has engaged no other great power in warfare, and Sassanid Persia
in that it has not expanded its territory.
The economy of the United States, like most of the hegemonic
economies, has been strong: more resilient and growing than most. But
the economy, and the ability to carry out hegemonic interventions, may
be weakened over time by some indications of state maturity: an orientation toward consumption, the incurring of debt that may exceed productive capacity, and a greater desire for domestic comfort and security
than for arcane responsibilities of hegemony.
While loss of alliances was a factor in the loss of hegemony in two
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cases, most of the successful hegemons did not depend on alliances.
While in its early decades the United States could possibly have been
successful without allies, it was more assiduous than any of the others
except France in building alliances.
Like all hegemons except Rome, the United States was challenged,
in this case by Russia. What was unusual was that the three great powers of the period—a declining Russia, a continuing Japan, and a rising
China—were all peripheral to the civilization of the hegemon.
While the United States was one of the hegemons that initiated
wars, like the Romans these were never against a major power. Looking
at the Russian challenge in historical perspective, it was more like
Roman relations with the Sassanids —not friendly, but not directly violent either. On three occasions the United States became strongly
involved in secondary wars in East Asian, South Asian and Islamic
Civilizations.
The United States is one of the hegemons that has so far presided
over if not preserved peace in its own civilization and over Latin
American civilization as well. Whether its interventions in other civilizations have contributed to peace in other civilizations is a question
that will have to be left to later historians.
The United States, then, is unusual in its seeking of alliances, its
economic support of other states including major powers, and its intercivilizational reach. But undoubtedly all the hegemons would be anomalous in some respects. On the whole, therefore, it would appear that the
United States is so far experiencing what might be considered a normal
hegemony.

NOTES
Editor's Note: Our peer review system is anonymous on both sides. In
this case, after the peer review and the author's response, we found
the exchange so interesting that we secured permission to identify
both the reviewer and author to each other. The reviewer was George
Von der Muhll, Matt Melko's response is below.
Background
This article was a paper was intended for presentation in 2006 at
the 35e congres de la Societe internationale pour l'etude comparee des
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civilizations, but the hard copy was lost when the bag it was in was
stolen from the train going from the airport to Paris. Since I was heavily engaged in chairing sessions, David Wilkinson generously agreed on
short notice to replace me at the designated session. Working from
hastily written notes, Wilkinson presented a paper entitled "The Paper
Melko Should Have Given." The notes and tape of the session were
subsequently sequestered. If I recall correctly, though the notes
appeared to be in English, Wilkinson gave the presentation in French.
Peer Review
The paper was rediscovered on the computer as two articles on
hegemony were being considered by the CCR editors. It was suggested
that it might be interesting to juxtapose the paper with the articles to
provide a wider range of views on hegemony in world history.
Accordingly the paper was submitted for peer review, and the reviewer
quickly responded with an excellent, nuanced response. Fortunately, for
the author, his ignorance far exceeded his inventory, and there just wasn't time to fill the gaps. So it was decided to borrow from Toynbee
(1934-61: v. 7-10), who often presented comments from his colleagues
in the notes without attempting to revise his text.
Arcane Controversies
"From the outset," writes the reviewer, "terms are introduced that
seem more contestable to the lay reader than to those who have taken
part in these controversies over the years, and at several points these
controversies are referred to rather than explicated."
I can see how this might seem, but probably these controversies
should be deleted rather than explicated. The main controversy is explicated, though it may be that it has been infrequently addressed directly.
Writers from the late decades of the 20th century, focusing on the
benevolent functions of hegemony, usually do not notice that they are
contradicting the balance of power theorists of earlier decades. The
inferred question, put bluntly, is whether state systems fare better with
or without a hegemon.
Arcane Hegemons
"Even members of our society may know little about the Chalukya
state and its neighbors or what territory the 'Tepanec' state/empire (?)
encompasses and when it flourished, and those uncertainties can raise
questions in lay minds about what kinds of entities are being compared
and whether their use in analytic comparisons is appropriate."

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol58/iss58/9

10

Melko: Hegemony vs. Balance of Power Within and Between Civilizations in
Matthew Melko

85

Alas, I possess one of the lay minds. I would have to go back to the
source (Melko 2001: 92-94, 117-120) to find out a little more about
Chalukyas or Tepanecs. For purposes of this essay, 1 can only say that
they appeared to me to have been the strongest states in a civilizational
state system.
Exhaustive or Merely Illustrative?
"It was not clear to this reader whether the states being compared
are to be considered an exhaustive list or [a] merely illustrative set
drawn from several thousand years of history; many familiar names (the
Maya, the Inca, the Khmer Empire, the Mongols) are missing, and
while that may be because of the definitions used by the author for
inclusion or exclusion, some explanation and justification for his procedures would be helpful."
The set considered was neither exhaustive nor illustrative. It was
chosen from 38 cases of longer than two decade general wars gathered
from perhaps a year's (certainly not exhaustive) survey of world history. The Incas and Mongols were not included because they were not
involved in such general wars. I don't remember about the Mayas or
Khmer; once I exclude I tend to focus on what I retain. In any event, the
15 cases I followed further and listed were all of those that emerged
from a general war or, in four cases, more than one general war. So the
list was more than illustrative, but exhaustive only within a limited context.
Unfriendly Lists
"At some points, the paragraphs consist of mere lists of state names
that would seem better placed in a systematically constructed appendix.
Such paragraphs can leave the impression that one is reading a transcript of a research professor's discussion with a sophisticated team of
graduate students rather than a reader-friendly essay designed to draw
the general reader into a hitherto-unexplored domain of potential interest."
Agreed. An appendix would have been better. The list of 15 hegemons, many arcane, seems particularly boring until you get to the West.
Other Questions
"Other Questions concern the operational definitions used in the
argument, the boundaries defining the units in question, the relationship
of the analytic scheme to other comparable discussions of hegemonic
state systems, the logical structure of the explanations offered, and the
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ultimate objective of the essay's arguments."
Gulp. I'm not very good at this. In these three articles on hegemony we may differ somewhat on these concepts, which may account in
part for some other differences that may be apparent. I see a state system as a relationship of autonomous political states, usually within a
single civilization, though sometimes a state external to the civilization
may be drawn into a particular general war. Within this system some
states are great powers, strong enough to influence other powers. A
hegemon would be a state that is perceived to be the strongest in the system. There are reifications here with regard to the system, the great
powers, the hegemon and the general war. As for the logical structure,
this is always a problem for me because whatever you present first
always seems to require something prior that has been omitted or is presented later.
As for the ultimate purpose of the essay, on rereading I cannot find
it. I infer that the author, in combining the results of the study of what
happened to the 15 hegemons, with previous studies, was led to the
conclusion that the evidence that either dominant hegemans or balanced
great powers produce peace or stability is, at best, weak. Added to this,
since it might be of interest to Westerners, is the perception that so far,
except that it ranges farther than usual beyond its own civilization, the
United States appears to be behaving as a comparatively normal hegemon.
Only One World War?
One operational definition that disturbed the reviewer was the conflation of World Wars I and II as a single war. He thinks this "a profoundly unsatisfactory stretch . . ." and in about ten or eleven lines
makes an impressive case against this conflation. He concludes: "To
make one war out of two in light of the exigencies of an operational definition seems to me to be a clear example of the implausible intrusion
of a certain kind of misplaced social science methodology into history."
But the study of civilizations is a social science intrusion into history. Four of our earlier presidents were sociologists. Lenski and
Sanders are macrosociologists. Toynbee once wrote to me that he considered Spengler, Kroeber and himself, as well as Sorokin, sociologists.
Many of the general wars I listed, e.g. the Thirty Years War, were conflated peviously by historians, and I conflated a few more. General
Wars, Great Powers, hegemons and civilizations are all reifications. Our
empirical work consists largely of quantifying reifications. Medical
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sociologists are quantifying speculative diagnoses of varieties of autism
or of memory loss such as mild cognitive impairment or mild degenerative dementia and telling us whether or not they are increasing. We
can't get along without reification. I do think, however, that this is the
first time any idea of mine has been associated with profundity.
Hegemony Scaled
The reader asks if, on a scale of relationships based on dominance
and subordination, the sequence might be empire, hegemony, bipolar
system, balance of power system and isolated system.
I would agree with that sequence of organization but add, after balance of power, a multipower system that lacked either hegemon or great
powers. Wilkinson, examining a much greater sample, finds this to have
been the most common system in world history (2005).
Limitations of this Study
The reader thinks that the absence of such a schema illustrates
"what seems to me one of the ways in which the essay under consideration seems to me to need a more explicit adumbration of the context
presupposed but not explicitly identified in the discussion of hegemonic relationships and their alternatives."
True. In this article only hegemonic and balance of power systems
were compared, only hegemonic research was cited for support, the
weakness of balance of power systems in preserving stability or peace
inferred but not demonstrated from earlier research.
Tautological Explanations
It is important "to express concern over the prevalence of tautological explanations in the essay. There are simply too many explanatory
sentences such as 'Peace is achieved when great powers are satisfied
with the current situation to the extent that they think war will not
improve it.' How do we know when 'great Powers" have reached such
levels of satisfaction? Not because of any independent evidence that
such calculations have in fact been performed by the actors, but simply
because the other states in a hegemonic system have not in fact sought
to attack the hegemon—which is, purportedly, what is to be explained."
The hegemons do not attack because the status quo seems preferable to the cost and risks of trying to achieve imperial control. The great
powers do not attack because the status quo seems preferable to
attempting to dislodge the hegemon. It does seem to be a tautological
explanation, but all powers are practicing a policy of the Status Quo
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(Morganthau 1978" 42-47) which is, in fact, the policy most nations
have practiced most of the time. This is why peace is normal, and partly why historians and political scientists spend more time and effort trying to explain the situations in which one or another nation does not follow this policy.
The Benefits of Competition
Robert Wesson "offers a broad range of stimulating hypotheses
concerning other economic, scientific, aesthetic and other benefits from
non-hegemonic competition among states, but these possibilities aren't
even hinted at in this essay as possible subjects for future research. . . .
(T)his reviewer would have liked to have seen either a few suggestions
of that nature or else an explicit justification for inquiring solely into the
conditions promoting war and peace."
Wesson's is a wonderful book (1978) that has received inadequate
attention. There certainly should be more attention given to these subjects. Thanks for this challenging and constructive review.
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